Management at Kobayashi Pharmaceutical in the mid-1960s to mid-1970s was characterized by a focus on accounting and value-adding. From this period, all branch chiefs were summoned to the head office or the Tokyo Branch once a month, and discussion groups were convened to examine that month's financial reports and management policies for the following month. Company executives reported that month's provisional corporate financial results, followed by reports of each branch's sales and profits along with pertinent instructions. Numbers don't lie. Each month revealed whether the company was earning a profit or operating in the red. Inevitably, the importance of management was put into practice.

Businesses continued to operate, however, even if occasional losses were conceded. After all, profit cannot necessarily be determined by merely summing up all single transactions. Management at the time attempted to eliminate such transactions as best it could. As the saying goes, avoiding losses was the basic policy.

In order to put this plan into practice, the right of on-the-spot price determination was minimized. This was a marked difference compared to the time when on-the-spot calls were considered important. Arbitrary decision and execution" was severely admonished, and when transactions were carried out contrary to instructions, an obligation to submit a "written apology" (a reflective letter submitted when a mistake was committed) was imposed. Delays in setting prices were pointed out in order to force submission of a ringisho (request for managerial decision - a document submitted to obtain corporate approval and consensus) to the highest levels, but even these actions were still processed as being beyond control.

The focus on accounting led to improvements in profit margins and managers became increasingly competent with numbers, a fact that greatly contributed to the modernization of Kobayashi Pharmaceutical. On the other hand, the tendency for management to conform was also strong, however.

As one example, the "voluntary chain" known as the Yuyaku Group was formed in the 1960s. This was a progressive chain organized of 150 stores each in the Tokyo and Kinki regions. Kobayashi Pharmaceutical and its affiliate stores shared equal rights and obligations and engaged in such practices as joint stocking and store modification. "Equal rights and obligations" notwithstanding, this was a chain organized by Kobayashi Pharmaceutical without profitability as its objective. When operations stalled around 1972, the "Yuyaku Group" became largely inactive. Furthermore, around the same time, JMF was organized as an innovative wholesale medical supply firm, beginning with Kobayashi Pharmaceutical. It was a highly motivated attempt at the time, but operations stagnated. The Physician Sales Section followed the same path as well. This field entered the business late and was under severe competition. What managers and supervisors had to face, however, was not other strong companies, but rather "management" within their own company.

In the corporate management of Japan during the stable growth period of the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, management focused on accounting and value-adding had become a matter of course. As it was a time when hope for market expansion and the desire to develop new fields was thin, all companies came to face these issues. This was the time when, together with focus management, new products were developed one after another, beginning with aggressive marketing at Anmerts and the rebirth of development initiative enterprises. These two elements overlapped and simultaneously existed in parallel. By operating division, the Business (Wholesale) Department could be classified as focus management and the Product Department as development initiative. Accordingly, an accurate comprehension of these two motions-in-progress is indispensable to understanding Kobayashi Pharmaceutical after 1965.